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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
and the cost of debt and to investigate if social norms play a role in the corporate debt market. 
This is done by researching the impact of CSR on the interest rate spread of bank loans and 
yield spread of corporate bonds in Europe. The sample includes 1711 bank loans, 742 Euri-
bor-denominated and 969 Libor-denominated, and 645 corporate bonds of 18 European coun-
tries in the period 2003 - 2017. The relationship is tested with OLS regression investigating 
four measures of CSR with a set of explanatory variables to control for company specific 
criteria as well as loan and bond characteristics. 
 
The empirical findings suggest that for Euribor-denominated bank loans the different ESG 
scores, except for the governance aspect, decrease the interest rate spread by an average of 
4% with a 10-point increase in the respective score. Furthermore, companies with the highest 
CSR score pay up to 30% lower interest rate, with all four aspects having statistical signifi-
cance. For Libor-denominated loans, this impact disappears, and it seems as if the relationship 
with corporate social responsibility vanishes. This opposing results for Euribor and Libor 
loans are interesting, because this kind of research has not been conducted previously, and 
signals that CSR is only prevalent in the Eurozone private debt market as opposed to debt 
markets in other currencies 
 
In the public debt market, yield spreads of corporate bonds experience a similar decrease as 
Euribor loans for the environmental and social aspect, although the governance aspect has the 
opposing effect and increases the yield. To conclude, the private and the public debt market 
appear to have a similar relationship with CSR, though only applicable to Euribor loans. This 
confirms the stakeholder and risk mitigation theory for the overall, social and environmental 
score, and the overinvestment theory for the governance aspect. 
 
The results highlight that lenders in general value corporate social responsibility as risk mit-
igating and view it as a long-term investment. This provides information to companies on 
how they can decrease their cost of debt by implementing specific aspects of corporate social 
responsibility in their business activities. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEY WORDS: CSR, ESG, cost of debt, bank loans, corporate bonds
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of social responsibility is gaining greater attention by companies in order 
to reflect the social aspect of the firm culture. Being environmentally friendly, treating 
employees well and enhancing the greater social good are just a few examples of how 
companies can act socially responsible and have positive reputation. On the other hand, 
so-called sin firms, active in industries like tobacco, weapons and alcohol, are on the 
opposite side and do not behave after social norms. Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), sustainability, Corporate Social Performance (CSP), triple bottom line and ESG 
are used synonymously (Menz 2010), and all of these terms refer to the same issue 
throughout this thesis. 
 
The reason for companies to follow the socially responsible path are diverse. Firms expect 
better reputation and thereof higher sales and profit. Employees reward their employer 
for treating them well by being more productive and loyal. Customers feel more confident 
buying products or services from socially responsible companies, and society supports 
“green” firms who engage in eco-friendly production. Another reason is better risk man-
agement, as stronger sustainability can decrease different kind of risks. For example, com-
panies incorporating high environmental standards within its business also lower pollu-
tion of nature. BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 or Foxconn’s confession of child 
labor in their fabrics shed negative light on the companies damaging their reputation. 
BP’s stock lost 50% in value over the months after the catastrophe (Mejri & De Wolf 
2013). Events like these occur regularly and eventually hurt the companies’ performance. 
 
In terms of cost-efficiency, introducing a CSR culture is cost intensive in the short-term, 
but expected to pay off in the long-term, not only in terms of sales and profits, but also 
risk-wise. Companies assume that investing in social norms will influence future profits 
and decrease risk. Based on this assumption, the cost of debt is directly influenced, as 
lower future risk and higher profitability are both expected to decrease interest rates. The 
main goal for equity investors is a company’s profitability and future growth of company 
value, whereas creditors are only interested in a firm’s repayment ability and solvency 
(Erragragui 2018). This is specifically an important issue in this thesis, as it explains a 
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potential difference in the impact of CSR on the cost of debt and equity. Debtholders are 
more sensitive to the downside risk than equity investors and as CSR builds firm reputa-
tion and is expected to be positive to avoid downside risk, CSR has a relationship with 
the cost of debt. This issue is tackled in the thesis and will be examined in detail through-
out the paper. 
 
Previous literature regarding the impact of social norms on the cost of equity is extensive, 
especially in the form of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), whereas research on the 
effect on the cost of debt is scarce. Thus, the focus of the thesis is a rather new topic and 
might give some new results to better understand the role of social norms in the corporate 
debt market. 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate whether corporate social responsibility has any 
implication on the cost of private and public debt in Europe. More precisely, do banks 
and lenders reward companies for being socially responsible or is this issue not incorpo-
rated in the interest rates. 
 
To investigate this effect, the impact of four different responsibility measures, the overall 
CSR, the environmental, the social and the governance aspect, on the interest rate spread 
of bank loans and the yield spread of corporate bonds in 18 European countries is empir-
ically researched. In order to also evaluate if very high or low CSR performance has dif-
ferent implication, the top and bottom 25% scores of the four aspects are examined. 
 
1.2. Contribution 
 
By now there has been done little research on the relationship between CSR and the cost 
of debt. The vast amount of papers focuses on the US public and private debt market, 
whereas just a selected number of research has been done in the European market. This 
thesis contributes to existing literature by focusing on the European private and public 
debt market investigating a company’s overall CSR performance, as well as the three 
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pillars Environmental, Social and Governance. The sample period 2003-2017 covers the 
financial crisis 2007/08 and the European sovereign debt crisis, and thereby provides in-
formation on whether there has been any impact of this turbulent times on social respon-
sibility. Furthermore, a novelty of this thesis is the comparison of the cost of bank loans 
and corporate bonds. Do banks incorporate CSR information differently than bond inves-
tors in their lending rates, based on their superior knowledge and difference in decision 
making? 
 
1.3. Research Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses of this thesis center on the issue of socially responsible companies and 
their cost of private and public debt. The first hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
there is a negative relationship between CSR and lending rates: 
 
H1: Cost of debt decreases with higher levels of overall CSR and the three ESG aspects. 
 
Several theories of corporate social responsibility support this hypothesis, as they view 
strong responsibility as risk mitigating and as a positive impact on long-term profitability. 
Based on previous literature there is mixed evidence on the relationship, as evaluated in 
more detail in chapter 3, but the hypothesis is backed by combining theoretical back-
ground and previous research. 
 
In previous literature, there has not been done research on the difference between bank 
loans and corporate bonds with regards to CSR. Banks possess superior information 
knowledge compared to public lenders, thus there might be an asymmetric impact on the 
cost of loans and bonds. Based on this, the second hypothesis investigates whether bank 
loans and corporate bonds differ in their interest rates: 
 
H2: CSR has an asymmetric impact on the cost of bank loans and corporate bonds. 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
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In the second chapter the theoretical framework behind the central issues of the thesis is 
evaluated. The term Corporate Social Responsibility, its historical evolution and perspec-
tives are described, as well as the CSR theories to better understand how it can impact the 
cost of debt. Furthermore, the corporate debt market is covered, aiming to give an over-
view of characteristics of bank loans and corporate bonds, how they differ and what in-
fluences their interest rates. Afterwards the third chapter reviews previous literature on 
the impact of CSR on the cost of private and public debt, and the cost of capital. The data 
description and the methodology will follow in the fourth chapter and form the foundation 
for the empirical part that follows in the fourth chapter. In the final chapter, the conclusion 
finalizes the thesis.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the theoretical framework to develop a better 
understanding of the topics focused on in the empirical part. In the first four chapters, 
CSR, its historical evolution and its different aspects and perspectives will be examined. 
Thereafter, the cost of debt in its different forms and the corporate debt market will be 
explained. 
 
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 
In 1998, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) decided to 
provide a common understanding of CSR in a two-year-program. Hence, in 2000 a com-
monly accepted definition of CSR was developed in a discussion forum with international 
participants of the WBCSD council: “Corporate social responsibility is the commitment 
of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with employees, 
their families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life.” 
(World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2000) 
 
The term “sustainable economic development” in this context is diverse, as it spans a 
large amount of different aspects. On the one hand it is the environmental factor, as being 
eco-friendly clearly contributes to sustainable development, but on the other hand it in-
cludes inconspicuous parts such as corruption or bribery, as these clearly have an impact 
on the sustainable development as well. Generally speaking all the factors that belong to 
this definition are called ESG and will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2.3. 
 
Based on the WBCSD definition, CSR also includes the interaction of a firm with its “[…] 
employees, their families, the local community and society at large […]” (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development 2000), who all belong to the group of stakeholders 
of a company. Thus, the stakeholder theory plays an important role in the CSR universe 
and is further explained in Chapter 2.4.1. 
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Companies motivation of implementing CSR into its business activities are diverse, as 
they may aim to enhance legitimacy, reputation and brand image, improve the relation-
ship to stakeholders, or to increase employees’ satisfaction through better safety and 
health standards. Besides the goal of better financial performance and higher profits 
through the implementation of a social responsibility culture, firms also try to make the 
world a better place. (Izzo and Magnanelli 2017) Since the financial crisis 2008, trust is 
an important issue that arose in the financial world and is another component of social 
capital. Market participants need to have trust and confidence in the system and its coun-
terparties for a well-functioning financial market (Lins et al. 2017). 
 
2.2. The historical evolution of CSR 
 
Corporate responsibility and social norms in the financial world have its roots from the 
1950s. Bowen (1953) is seen as the founder of the term Corporate Social Responsibility 
in his book “Social Responsibilities of the Businessman”, where it is suggested that social 
responsibility should be inherited in strategic planning and managerial decision-making 
by business executives. In the 1960s, academics make it clear that awareness of CSR is 
rising and short-term investments to strengthen ethical aspects with the company will lead 
to higher long-term profits (Davis 1960). In this period, the term social responsibility has 
been tried to be defined, as Davis (1960) suggests that CSR is composed of the socio-
economic and the socio-human aspects. This first definition can be referred to as the an-
cestor of the ESG term. The next decade has been characterized by a shift, as social re-
sponsibility is no longer the executive’s task but rather the company’s task. (Davis 1973) 
First research papers were published examining CSR by known academics such as Fried-
man (1970), Moskowitz (1972) or Vance (1975). In the 1980s, the stakeholder theory by 
Freeman (1984) requires companies to value their relationship with all stakeholders, not 
only shareholders in order to ensure function business within all interest groups. CSR and 
ethics further move into the spotlight enhancing the public to expect increased awareness 
for this topic within firm’s operations. 
 
After the turn of the millennium and the stronger globalization through the introduction 
of the internet, Corporate Social Responsibility becomes a global matter. The European 
19 
 
 
Union, the OECD and the United Nations all implement their suggestions in guidelines 
and reports, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global 
Compact and the ISO26000 standard by the EU. Throughout the next years, especially 
during crisis periods like the financial crisis 2008, CSR gained greater attention and im-
portance for companies. This statement is highlighted by facts, as 88% of participating 
CEOs from all over the world believe that integrating CSR in financial markets is essen-
tial to move forward based on the latest UN Global Compact – Accenture Strategy CEO 
study 2016. In a survey by Nielsen Global Survey 2014 on Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, 55% of the participants are willing to pay more for products and services if they are 
offered by socially responsible firms. This figure increased by 10 percentage points since 
the last survey in 2011 and is expected to rise further in the future. (Nielsen Global Survey 
2014) Given this positive movement, CSR becomes more important within the firm cul-
ture and decision making, as it is rewarded by the customer base. The company does not 
only have the incentive to act responsible but can also increase sales and profits due to 
their ability to charge more for their goods and services. 
 
Social responsibility in the financial markets is experiencing enormous growth, which 
can be put into perspective by examining the Socially Responsible Investment trend over 
the last years. SRI is an investment approach that includes environmental, social and gov-
ernance factors in their investment portfolio. Based on a SRI study by Eurosif, SRI strat-
egies have been growing enormously, with a combined investment volume of EUR 11 
trillion in 2011, to EUR 16 trillion in 2013, to EUR 23 trillion in 2015. In the period 2011 
to 2015, the volume of SRI more than doubled. (Eurosif 2014; Eurosif 2016) As SRI also 
includes investing in corporate bonds, the increased importance of CSR is expected to be 
incorporated in the yield of the bonds. 
 
2.3. CSR and its perspectives 
 
Within the literature, Corporate Social Responsibility is most commonly split into the 
three subdivisions Environmental, Social and Governance, often referred to as ESG. They 
build the framework for a company’s social responsibility. Within the environmental as-
pect, issues such as climate change, resource depletion (e.g. water), pollution and 
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deforestation are included. The social component focuses towards working conditions 
(e.g. child labour, slavery), the interaction with local communities, conflict management, 
health and safety issue, employee relations and diversity in all its aspects. Finally, the 
third pillar governance is related to executive compensation, issues including bribery and 
corruption, political engagement (e.g. political lobbying, donations), board diversity and 
structure, and the company’s tax strategy. 
 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2000) on the other hand 
views five aspects as the key components of CSR: Human rights, Employee rights, Envi-
ronmental protection, Community involvement and supplier relations. Although in a later 
forum, the WBCSD adds more aspects, these five build the framework. In general, the 
WBCSD declares that there is no clear definition of what these five pillars include, as 
countries have different legislations, but they try to give a common understanding of what 
shall be included. Human rights consist of child or slave labor as well as general human 
rights like breathing fresh air or drinking clean water. Within the Employee rights aspect 
issues like working conditions or also opportunities to improve skills are included. Envi-
ronmental protection is self-describing as it includes all different kinds of how to be en-
vironmentally friendly. Community involvement is constituted of investments in the local 
community such as charity events or donations. Lastly, supplier relation is the way a 
company interacts with its suppliers and contractors.  
 
In comparison these two frameworks of CSR components include similar issues, only 
deteriorating in their allocation and methodology. Throughout the paper, the ESG frame-
work will be used, as it is the most commonly accepted one within the CSR universe. 
 
2.4. CSR Theories 
 
There are several theories on CSR and how it impacts a company’s financial performance 
and risk. These theories play a key role in explaining a potential impact of CSR on the 
cost of debt. The shareholder and stakeholder view both have contradicting arguments 
with respect to social responsibility. Similarly, the risk mitigation and the legitimacy 
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theory assume a positive linkage, whereas the overinvestment and agency conflict theory 
assume a negative linkage between CSR and firm performance. 
 
2.4.1. Shareholder vs. Stakeholder view 
 
Friedman (1962) states that shareholder wealth maximization is the absolute goal of a 
company, and therefore the company only needs to be socially responsible to the share-
holders, and explicitly nobody else. Advocates of this theory argue that activities related 
to CSR use corporate resources that should actually be consumed to generate profit for 
the shareholders. Taking into consideration social and environmental issues only produce 
unnecessary costs that negatively impact the target of increasing the share price (Menz 
2010). This theory predicts that improving a firm’s social responsibility stimulates share-
holder value maximization. Furthermore, Friedman (1962) represents the view that share-
holders themselves should decide the level of social responsibility, as the executive’s sole 
task is to focus on business. 
 
The stakeholder approach has been first examined by Freeman (1984), where the author 
defines this view and many subsequent studies build their model upon his framework. 
Freeman’s theory (1984) postulates that the real success of a company is achieved by 
satisfying all its stakeholders. There are stakeholders who demand social responsibility 
and base their decision-making on this issue. According to the stakeholder theory, satis-
fying these stakeholders through implementing positive ethical norms in the firms results 
in greater success. They increase customer loyalty, employee satisfaction, support by lo-
cal community and the government, and finally to higher profits in the long-term. 
(Oikonomou et al. 2014) 
 
2.4.2. Risk mitigation theory 
 
If CSR issues are priced in the corporate debt market, then the key is to evaluate what 
drives lenders to incorporate social norms in the interest rates. The risk mitigation view 
represents the idea that initiatives enhancing social responsibility reduce firm risk. In fact, 
Lee and Faff (2009) confirm this view in their studies, where they find that firms with 
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high CSR scores have lower idiosyncratic risk and lower returns. If ESG activities indeed 
influence a company’s risk, then this will accurately be reflected in the cost of debt.  
 
One example of how social irresponsibility can significantly increase idiosyncratic risk 
and thereby influence the cost of debt is the BP oil spill accident. The yield spread on the 
BP corporate bond increased to 7.57%, which is higher than “junk bonds” at that time. 
Furthermore, Fitch downgraded BP’s rating from AA to BBB. The firm suffered not only 
through loss of reputation, but also faced liquidity problems. Although BP was able to 
stay in business, insolvency or bankruptcy could have happened as well. (Oikonomou et 
al. 2014) Likewise, debtholders are expected to take into account problems that might 
arouse from unethical and socially irresponsible behavior by incorporating this increased 
risk factor in their lending rates. Such behavior can be found in so-called sin firms, which 
are companies engaging in business like alcohol, tobacco or gambling. Jo and Na (2012) 
indeed find that if these corporates have higher levels of CSR, than firm risk decreases, 
thereby confirming the risk mitigation theory. 
 
2.4.3. Overinvestment theory 
 
Implementing and maintaining strong social responsibility within a firm is costly and it 
needs to be evaluated whether these costs exceed the benefits of high CSR with negative 
consequences on the financial performance. The overinvestment theory focuses on this 
issue and states that having very high levels of CSR are considered overinvestments, as 
due to the substantial increase in costs profitability decreases. Based on this theoretical 
approach, companies with the highest CSR scores are expected to have higher cost of 
debt due to poorer financial performance. To test this theory, in the empirical part of this 
thesis it is examined if the top CSR companies indeed have higher lending rates. (Goss 
and Roberts 2011) 
 
2.4.4. Agency conflict theory 
 
The agency theory assumes that managers overinvest in corporate social responsibility 
for personal benefits, as they expect better public reputation and stronger support by 
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society. Barnea and Rubin (2010) find that firm value increases with higher levels of CSR, 
but above a specific point, harms firm value, due to overinvesting at the expense of share-
holders. Above this level, managers extract positive reputation only for themselves 
whereas shareholders suffer due to a decrease in profits. (Barnea and Rubin 2010) The 
agency theory is an extension to the overinvestment theory and provides additional rea-
soning for why extreme high social responsibility might increase the cost of debt. 
 
2.4.5. Legitimacy theory 
 
The term legitimacy can be defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” (Suchman 1995) Within the business 
context of a company and based on this definition, corporates are only able to perform 
their business successfully if they act and operate within the limits of what society views 
as a socially acceptable behavior, basically a company’s attitude towards CSR (O’Do-
novan 2002). The legitimacy theory is closely tied to the stakeholder theory and assumes 
that there exists a social contract between a company and its society. In this context it is 
essential to define the society of a company as it can widely deteriorate. Smaller compa-
nies that do business only within a region or one country shall limit their social activities 
only to regional matters, whereas multinational corporates need to target their CSR initi-
atives to global and worldwide matters. (Lanis and Richardson 2012) The legitimacy the-
ory is concerned with the level of information about social responsibility companies share 
in their different kinds of reports, as they will focus only on positive facts of their CSR 
culture and try to avoid mentioning any controversial topics that could harm the business. 
Due to this assumption the theory views CSR reports with caution. (O’Donovan 2002; 
Erragrui 2018) 
 
2.5. Corporate debt market 
 
As of the second quarter in 2018, the global debt market amounts to $247 trillion, almost 
3.5 times the size of the equity market of $71 trillion. (Institute of International Finance 
2018) The most recent report by SIFMA estimates the global bond market at around $100 
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trillion, of which 28% is attributable to EU 28 countries, compared to a share of 17% by 
these countries in the global equity market. (SIFMA 2018) Thereby only the bond market 
itself is larger than the equity market. Taking into account all these statistical facts, the 
debt market is far the most important source of external financing for firms. Still equity 
markets (i.e. stock markets) are more commonly followed by analysts and have a stronger 
presence in the academic literature. The lack of attention of the debt market due to its 
sheer size provides an important incentive for this paper, as new contributions in this 
sector are of importance in order to better understand the global debt markets. 
 
The corporate debt market can be split into the private and the public debt market. Within 
this thesis, the private debt market is characterized by the financing process between 
lender and borrower is held private, meaning that the public is not able to participate in 
the financing. The most common form of private debt are bank loans. Either the loan is 
provided by only one bank or by several banks, which is called a syndicated loan. The 
public debt market on the other hand is the financing process where the public can par-
ticipate, with a bond being the most usual instrument. If a company issues a bond, every-
body can theoretically participate in the financing process. There are similarities and dif-
ferences between the characteristics in how interest rates in these two debt markets are 
set and will be examined in more detail in the next two chapters.  
 
2.5.1. Bank loans 
 
A fundamental issue is to evaluate what are the main influencing contributors in a bank’s 
decision of setting the interest rates of their loans. Generally, the process can be split into 
company-specific, loan-specific and economic factors. Unarguably, the credit-worthiness 
of a company is the primary issue, representing the ability of a customer to pay back the 
loan. In order to quantify this ability, banks try to assign a credit rating to their clients, 
which is done by so-called rating agencies. Large companies usually get rated by rating 
agencies, like Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s. This is where the CSR issue has an 
important role, as a company’s social norms has an impact on the credit risk. For example, 
the borrower might have to pay penalties for causing environmental catastrophes, like 
BP’s oil spill accident, or loses important customers due to child labor, which has another 
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impact on a decline in revenue. Just to put the importance of the environmental aspect 
into perspective, Weber et al. (2010) find that in 10% of all credit losses of German banks 
environmental risks were involved. 
 
Loan-specific criteria mainly incorporate the loan amount, the maturity and the secured 
position. Regarding the loan size, higher amount could mean higher losses for the banks 
in the event of bankruptcy. In terms of maturity, longer time-period usually results in 
stronger probability of loan failure, thus rates are expected to get higher with longer ma-
turity. Finally, if a loan is secured, the chance of repayment in the case of insolvency is 
higher than an unsecured loan. Thus, unsecured loans have on average higher interest 
rates. 
 
Finally, macroeconomic factors such as the level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
inflation represent the current state of the economy. (Gambacorta 2008). In order to con-
trol for this risk, this paper uses the spread of the bank loan interest rate over the Euribor 
or Libor. Both represent the current state of the economy. 
 
As throughout this paper, Euribor and Libor as base rates are examined separately, it is 
important to understand what the characteristics of these two interbank rates are in order 
to explain potential differences in the empirical results. The Euribor, the Euro Interbank 
Offered Rate, is the interest rate at which around 42 selected European banks in the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union, the so-called Eurozone, are prepared to lend to each other. The 
Euribor is determined by several factors, such as supply and demand, economic growth 
and inflation. The Euribor is only published in one currency, the Euro. (Eisl et al. 2017) 
 
The Libor, the London Interbank Offered Rate, is comparable to the Euribor, although it 
is the rate at which selected banks on the London money market lend to each other. The 
Libor is published in ten currencies, namely British Pound, US Dollar, Japanese Yen, 
Swiss Franc, Canadian Dollar, Australian Dollar, Euro, Danish Krone, Swedish Krona 
and New Zealand Dollar. The number of banks who set this rate differ based on the cur-
rencies, for the Swedish Krona it is for example only 6 banks, whereas for the US Dollar 
it is 18 banks. (Eisl et al. 2017) 
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The main difference between the two base rates is the currency issue. Any deviation be-
tween bank loans using Euribor and using Libor as base rates can be mostly explained by 
the underlying currency. Although in the sample of this paper, around 8% of the Libor-
denominated bank loans are issued in Euro, this share is minor and has limited impact on 
potential differences in the results. To conclude, Euribor-denominated bank loans are is-
sued in Euro and Libor-denominated bank loans are issued in other currencies, mainly 
US Dollar and British Pound. 
 
Banks’ lending decisions are based on a variety of information that may not be easily 
available for outsiders. In fact, banks do possess superior information about companies, 
as they need it to make decisions about the ability to repay debt. As a result, the loan 
market is seen as informational efficient. When firms seek outside investments in the 
form of bank loans, they are willing to provide information in exchange of funds. Altman 
et al. (2006) find that the syndicated loan market is more informational efficient than the 
bond market, as it is able to predict the default of a company earlier than the bond market. 
 
2.5.2. Corporate bonds 
 
The price of a coupon-paying bond is simply the sum of the discounted cash-flows, com-
puted as 
 
(1) 𝑃0 =
𝐶
1+𝑟
+
𝐶
(1+𝑟)2
+⋯+
𝐶
(1+𝑟)𝑛
+
𝑃𝑉
(1+𝑟)𝑛
 , 
 
where P0 is the current price of the bond, C are the coupon payments, PV is the par value 
of the bond, r is the discount rate and n is the number of periods. The most important 
concept for bond investors is the yield of a bond. It represents the return on the invest-
ment. When an investor buys a bond at its par value, then the yield is equal to the coupon 
interest. Any deterioration from the par value incurs a change in the yield. The relation-
ship between a bond price and the yield is inverse, an increase in the bond price results in 
a decrease of the yield, and vice versa. The most used and quoted measure to evaluate the 
rate of return of a bond is the Yield to Maturity (YTM), which signals the return for the 
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investment if the bond is hold until maturity. It represents the annual return of the invest-
ment, if all payments are scheduled and if the bond is held until the last payment. The 
YTM resamples the discount rate in Equation (1), where the bond price equals all future 
cash-flows. As a result, Yield to Maturity also takes into account the time value of money, 
as well as can be compared with bonds with different maturity and coupon payments, and 
therefore is often considered as the best measure of the return of a bond. (Fabozzi 2013: 
31-49) 
 
To understand how bond yields are priced, it is essential to examine the main factors 
considered by investors in the bond market, which are the issuer type, the creditworthi-
ness and the bond’s terms and conditions. (Fabozzi 2013: 131) 
 
In general, the main two types of bond issuers are governments and corporation. The 
difference between these two is that government bonds are considered safer investments 
due to their higher reliability of paying back debt, although some countries might have 
greater problems than others. The yield spread is considered the most used measure to 
indicate the difference between these two issuer types and is computed by the difference 
in the yields of bonds with similar characteristics. The creditworthiness of a bond repre-
sents the issuer’s ability to repay the debt and is usually quantified with the credit rating 
by a rating agency. The bond’s terms and conditions are characterized by factors like the 
maturity, embedded options and secured status. (Fabozzi 2013: 104-106) 
 
2.6. Credit rating 
 
As mentioned in the previous two chapters, the credit rating of a company comprises most 
risk factors and is performed by credit rating agencies, most commonly by Standard and 
Poor’s, Fitch or Moody’s. The credit rating is assessed by a letter system which differs 
slightly between these three, but basically follows the same principle. As the Standard & 
Poor’s ratings are used in this research, the rating system will be explained based on this 
example. S&P uses a letter system with D being the worst rating and AAA being the best. 
D-rated firms are on the verge of default, thus are the riskiest investment, whereas AAA 
indicates the safest form, usually only assigned to the strongest and safest governments 
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in the world, such as Germany. Most commonly, these ratings are divided into non-in-
vestment, or speculative, and investment grade. Non-investment grade companies bear a 
greater risk of default and have higher cost of debt, and investment grade firms bear lower 
risk with lower cost of debt. The rating agencies assess the credit rating based on firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk factors. Standard & Poor’s incorporates in their corpo-
rate credit rating country and industry risk, as well as firm characteristics like capital 
structure, financial policy and liquidity. (Fabozzi 2013) For debt investors, the rating 
plays the single most important role in their decision and is a key factor in determining 
the interest rate of a bank loan or the yield rate of a corporate bond.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although literature on the impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on the cost of capital 
is extensive, the bulk amount is about the cost of equity (e.g. Kempf and Osthoff 2007; 
Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; El Ghoul et al. 2011). In order to assess the linkage between 
CSR and the cost of debt, it is also necessary to examine how the cost of equity is affected 
by social responsibility, as it might partially explain how the cost of debt reacts.  
 
The keyword linked to the cost of equity is Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), invest-
ments based on social responsibility aspects. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) combine a long-
short strategy based on the top and bottom ESG ratings and find that this approach yields 
positive significant returns in the period 1992 to 2003. In contrary view, Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) find that stocks of sin firms have higher expected returns than com-
parable, not sinful companies. El Ghoul et al. (2011) research the impact of CSR on the 
cost of equity of US firms. The findings conclude that companies with better CSR scores 
profit from cheaper equity financing with factors such as better employee relations and 
environmental policies being the strongest drivers of this decrease. To obtain robust re-
sults, El Ghoul et al. (2011) furthermore show that sin companies engaging in tobacco 
and nuclear power production experience a substantial increase in the cost of equity. Rev-
elli and Viviani (2015) examine 85 SRI research studies spanning a period of 20 years 
and conclude that socially responsible investing leads to positive, negative and neutral 
excess returns across global markets. Lins et al. (2017) in a very recent paper find that 
SRI overperforms significantly in periods of low trust, such as the financial crisis. In the 
European stock markets, Auer (2016) investigates whether strategies based on the overall 
ESG score, as well as the three pillars, yields positive excess returns. The findings suggest 
that it is still possible for SRI to outperform in the period after 2011 in Europe. 
 
Literature on the cost of debt is limited although the debt market is by far larger than the 
equity market. Orlitzky et al. (2003) study 52 CSR studies that focus on the impact on the 
financial performance, whereby they find that none is linked to the cost of debt. Thus, it 
is surprising that research is scarce which enables this thesis to contribute new findings. 
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In the following chapters the existing literature about the relationship between CSR and 
the cost of debt is investigated, with the first chapter using the accounting measure of cost 
of debt computed as interest expenses divided by total debt, the second chapter using the 
interest rate on bank loans and the third examining the yield of corporate bonds. The 
fourth chapter focuses on academic research on the determinants of interest rates and 
bond yields. The final chapter concludes the literature review by summarizing previous 
research. 
 
3.1. Social norms in the corporate debt market 
 
La Rosa et al. (2018) investigate the relationship of CSR and the cost of debt by examin-
ing the accounting-based (i.e. interest rate) and market-based (i.e. corporate rating) cost 
of debt. The sample is composed of 1228 listed European non-financial firms in the period 
2005 – 2012. The findings suggest that better responsibility performance decreases the 
interest rate, and consistent with it, better performance increases the rating. Smaller com-
panies with higher CSR ratings have even cheaper access to debt than comparable larger 
companies, as they are perceived as innovative and forward looking with enormous po-
tential of enhancing long-term profitability due to their social investments. In addition, 
La Rosa et al. (2018) evaluate if this relationship holds even in times of a crisis by re-
searching the impact of CSR during the financial crisis 2008 and find that the results for 
both types of cost of debt are not statistically significant anymore. La Rosa et al. (2018) 
conclude that companies focus solely on maintaining profitability during turbulent times 
to keep business alive and social norms are of secondary importance.  
 
Erragragui (2018) evaluates the relationship of CSR and the cost of debt by focusing on 
the environmental and governance aspect on the accounting cost of debt. The research 
includes 214 US firms in the period 2000 - 2011. The results show that environmental 
strengths lower and environmental concerns increase the cost of debt. For Erragragui 
(2018) the key finding and positive contribution is the so-called “governance paradox”, 
as results show that governance strengths reduce interest rates, but governance concerns 
have no significant negative impact on the cost of debt. Erragragui (2018) suggests that 
negative governance performance is regarded as less informative, as many companies try 
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to avoid including controversial topics in their reports, also called the “legitimacy theory” 
(O’Donovan 2002). 
 
Ye and Zhang (2011) research the linkage of social norms and the cost of debt in China 
by examining around 1700 firms in 2007 and 2008. The finding of the empirical part 
concludes that there exists a U-shaped relationship between CSR and cost of debt. If a 
firm’s social responsibility is in between the sub-optimal and the super-optimal CSR 
level, it decreases the cost of debt. If the responsibility level is extremely low (i.e. sub-
optimal) or extremely high (i.e. super-optimal), the cost of debt increases. Ye and Zhang 
(2011) thereby support both the risk-mitigation and the overinvestment theory and sug-
gest that both are present in the Chinese debt market. 
 
Izzo and Magnanelli (2017) examine the link between CSR and the accounting cost of 
debt by including a sample of 332 worldwide firms in the period 2005 until 2009. The 
main conclusion is that social responsibility is only marginally incorporated in the deci-
sion process by banks and furthermore high levels of CSR increase the cost of debt con-
sistent with the overinvestment theory. Izzo and Magnanelli (2017) justify the results by 
the assumption that the debt market does not rely on the information from sustainability 
reports provided by the companies, and thus do not take into account this information in 
setting the cost of debt. 
 
La Rosa et al. (2018), Erragragui (2018), Ye and Zhang (2011) and Izzo and Magnanelli 
(2017) use as the measure for cost of debt interest expenses divided by the total outstand-
ing debt of a company, and do not differentiate between private (i.e. bank loans) and 
public (i.e. corporate bonds) debt. Other researchers go more into detail and research the 
impact of CSR on private debt (Goss and Roberts 2011; Hoepner et al. 2014; Kim et al. 
2014) and on public debt (Sharfman and Fernando 2008; Menz 2010; Oikonomou et al. 
2014; Ge and Liu 2015; Stellner et al. 2015), as will be discussed in the following chap-
ters. 
 
3.2. Social norms in the private debt market 
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Goss and Roberts (2011) research as one of the first the impact of CSR on private com-
pany debt and whether socially responsible firms get cheaper loans from banks. They 
examine if banks differentiate between issuing debt to companies with low and high CSR 
activities. They measure the impact of ESG rating on the interest rate of 3996 bank loans 
of US firms. Goss and Roberts (2011) value the role of banks as “quasi-insiders” having 
superior information and relationship with the companies. Their studies conclude that 
companies with low CSR performance pay up to 18 basis points more, whereas compa-
nies with higher than average CSR scores do not experience better loan terms. Banks see 
CSR concerns as risks for the company and therefore charge higher lending rates with 
less favorable terms. Companies being on the top of CSR initiatives on the other hand are 
considered by the banks as overinvestments without contributing additional value. Thus, 
they do not experience better loan conditions. Goss and Roberts (2011) see CSR as a 
second-order determinant for interest rate spreads, as the economic impact is modest. 
 
In their paper, Kim et al. (2014) investigate the effect of company’s responsibility on the 
interest rates of bank loans. Their dataset includes 12 545 syndicated loan facilities of 513 
firms from 19 worldwide countries in the period 2003 - 2007. Besides examining a firm’s 
CSR performance, the paper also investigates the bank’s responsibility behavior. The em-
pirical results suggest that companies get rewarded with lower interest rate spreads if they 
are more responsible. In numerical terms, loan spreads decrease by 24.80% with a one 
standard deviation increase in the CSR score. This effect is even stronger if the borrower 
and the lending bank both have similar levels of CSR. Like Goss and Roberts (2011), 
Kim et al. (2014) conclude that banks have superior information and are more effective 
in assessing CSR. 
 
Hoepner et al. (2014) study the implication of corporate and country sustainability on the 
cost of bank loans of worldwide companies, with focus on the social and environmental 
aspect. Their dataset includes 470 bank loan agreements in the period 2005 to 2012 cov-
ering 28 countries. The findings suggest that country sustainability has significant impact 
on the cost of bank loans, as higher social responsibility decreases the interest rates. 
Hereby it is noteworthy that the impact of the environmental pillar is almost twice as 
much as the social one. Firm-level sustainability on the other hand has no significant 
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impact on lending rates, whereby Hoepner et al. (2014) provide controversial results to 
other existing literature. 
 
The relationship between CSR and loan spreads of syndicated bank loans are researched 
by Bae et al. (2018), consisting of 5810 U.S. bank loans in the period of 1991 - 2008. 
Their focus is whether CSR strengths and concerns both influence the cost of private 
loans in terms of firm risk. Bae et al. (2018) expect banks to better judge if a firm’s CSR 
activities add additional value to the company’s business. They find that strengths lower 
firm risk, thereby reducing loan spreads, whereas concerns show the opposite effect. After 
controlling for credit ratings, concerns lose significance, although CSR strength still ap-
pear to have positive impact. Thus, Bae et al. (2018) conclude that rating agencies include 
the CSR aspect in their process of providing a credit rating and thereby influence the cost 
of debt and lending banks view a firm’s CSR strengths as informationally valuable. 
 
3.3. Social norms in the public debt market 
 
The relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and the public corporate debt 
market is measured in the literature with two determinants: the bond yield spread and the 
credit rating. Although bond ratings do not per se give information about how much the 
company pays for the bond, it is the main determinant in evaluating the cost of the cor-
porate bond.  
 
Oikonomou et al. (2014) research the relationship of CSR and the cost of corporate bonds 
of U.S. firms. Their sample comprises 3240 corporate bonds issued by 742 firms within 
the time period 1993 - 2008. In their paper, the authors split the social responsibility into 
several subsections to evaluate the impact of each aspect on the bond yield spread. Issues 
such as support for local communities, higher levels of product safety and quality, and 
avoiding controversies of a firm’s workforce, have a statistically significant positive im-
pact on the yield spread, meaning a decrease in the cost of debt. If looking at the overall 
level, good CSR performance is rewarded and negative is penalized with lower and higher 
corporate bond yield spreads, respectively. Oikonomou et al. (2014) suggest corporations 
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to be aware that social norms do have an impact on the debt financing, and thus should 
be incorporated in strategy and management planning.  
 
Ge and Liu (2015) study in their paper the linkage between CSP and yield spread on new 
bond issues on the US primary bond market. They investigate 4260 public bond issues in 
the USA in the period 1992 - 2009. In a first step, they find that better CSR performance 
results in better credit ratings for the respective company. After controlling for the credit 
rating, the results suggest that good Corporate Social Performance indeed is associated 
with lower yield spread. Similarly, poor CSR scores are linked with higher yield spread. 
They conclude that firms with better social norms and ethics can raise public debt for a 
lower cost. Additionally, they view that social norms may be valued different by private 
lenders (i.e. banks) and public lenders (i.e. bond investors). Ge and Liu (2015) thereby 
complement the hypotheses by Goss and Roberts (2011) that banks have superior infor-
mation and their attitude towards social responsibility differs from the corporate bond 
market. 
 
Stellner et al. (2015) use the rating approach and investigate the impact of CSR on the 
credit rating of Eurozone corporate bonds. They find that companies with strong CSR 
performance are rewarded with better ratings if the country itself has strong ESG perfor-
mance in an international comparison. The findings of this study can be strongly linked 
with Hoepner et al. (2014), who find this kind of relationship in the private debt market. 
 
Menz (2010) studies CSR and its implication on the yield spread of 498 corporate bonds 
issued in Euro covering a period of 38 months from July 2004 to August 2007. Applying 
different empirical models, no significant relationship between CSR and yield spreads is 
found. Menz (2010) argues that credit rating is of strongest interest for lenders and to 
some extent already incorporate information about CSR activities. With including an ex-
tra CSR rating to the model, it does not add any value to explaining yield spreads. 
 
With the focus on only one aspect of ESG, the environmental term, Sharfman and Fer-
nando (2008) examine its link with the cost of capital for 267 US firms. Companies en-
gaging in increased environmental risk management experience a higher cost of debt. The 
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authors explain this finding by claiming that investments in environmental responsibility 
above the necessary to be economically efficient and that higher risk management activity 
does increase leverage. 
 
3.4. Determinants of interest rate spreads and corporate yield spreads 
 
The measures for the cost of debt in the private and the public corporate debt market are 
the interest rate spread and the corporate yield spread, respectively. Therefore, it is essen-
tial to evaluate what factors determine these two to form reliable models and find key 
control variables for the empirical research. 
 
The International Monetary Fund (2013) suggests that the three main components of in-
terest rate pricing are the bank’s funding costs, the return on equity and the credit margin. 
With respect to the first item, the cost of funding is basically the interest rates for banks 
to borrow money, especially from other banks or central banks, and is commonly regarded 
as the interbank rate. In Europe, these are usually the Euribor or the Libor and represent 
the current economic conditions and its outlook. The return on equity represents the bor-
rower’s profitability and thereby its ability to repay debt with its own profits. Finally, the 
credit margin is mostly seen as the credit rating of a company as it incorporates a firm’s 
risk in all its aspects. (IMF 2013) 
 
Secondly, Gabbi and Sironi (2005) conclude that for pricing yields the rating of the cor-
porate bond by a rating agency is the single most important factor as it incorporates almost 
all different types of a company’s risk. Rating agencies thereby have strong influence on 
the pricing in the corporate bond market and need to act responsibly. Nevertheless, the 
financial crisis 2008 has shown that these agencies do not always behave responsibly. An 
additional determinant are state taxes as examined in previous literature (Elton et al. 2001; 
Gabbi and Sironi 2005; Liu et al. 2009), although this research has been done in the US 
market, and is not applicable on the European market, and therefore is omitted. 
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3.5. Conclusion on prior empirical research 
 
Based on the previously discussed literature, it can be concluded that social responsibility 
has an impact on the cost of debt, although the extent and magnitude of the relationship 
is mixed. La Rosa et al. (2018) and Erragragui (2018) to some extent find that the ac-
counting interest rate on debt decreases with higher CSR scores. Likewise, Kim et al. 
(2014) and Bae et al. (2018) suggest the same results for bank loans, whereas Goss and 
Roberts (2011) only evaluate that low social responsibility increases interest rates on bank 
loans, but high CSR has no significant impact. Oikonomou et al. (2014), Ge and Liu 
(2015), and Stellner et al. (2015) conclude that high responsibility lowers corporate bond 
yields. Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Ye and Zhang (2011), and Izzo and Magnanelli 
(2017) confirm in their studies the overinvestment theory, as companies with very high 
CSR performance experience an increase in cost of debt. Finally, Menz (2010) and Hoep-
ner et al. (2014) find no significant relationship of these two factors.  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To examine the impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on the cost of debt, several 
data resources are included for the empirical research. In the following subchapters, the 
description of data and the methodology will be provided. 
 
4.1. Data 
 
The sample is composed of non-financial listed companies from 18 European countries 
in the period 2003 - 2017. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. In line with previous research, financial firms are ex-
cluded from this sample as they play the key role in debt financing and have different 
regulations (Ge and Liu 2015; La Rosa et al. 2018). 
 
In order to quantify the level of CSR within a company it is essential to score them on a 
scale. In this thesis, Thomson Reuters Datastream ASSET4 database will be used which 
has CSR scores ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest possible CSR score. 
The database computes the overall CSR score by weighting the environmental, social, 
governance and economic component based on their weights. As the economic perspec-
tive is of secondary importance in the CSR universe and in academics, it is omitted. Nev-
ertheless, the overall calculated CSR score by ASSET4 is kept, as investors and banks 
still see this score as an average picture of a firm’s responsibility. Besides this overall 
CSR rating, scores for the three ESG components Environmental, Social and Governance, 
similarly rated on a scale from 0 to 100, are included in this research. Scores are con-
structed through the collection of 400 company-level ESG measures from publicly avail-
able sources, such as Annual Reports, CSR reports, Sustainability reports and NGO web-
sites. The final sample dataset includes 1094 listed non-financial European firms for 
which ESG ratings are available.  
 
The data selection for bank loans is retrieved from the Thomson Reuters LPC DealScan 
database (Goss and Roberts 2011; Kim et al. 2014). The database provides detailed 
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information about loans, including the interest rate margin over a base rate, starting and 
end date, tranche amount, loan type and purpose, whether it is secured or not, and rating 
information. The initial dataset for non-financial firms from the sample countries in the 
period 1.1.2003 to 31.12.2017 consists of 38 191 loans, and after correcting for the com-
panies with ESG scores of 5975 loans. Interest rates in this database are given as spreads 
over a base rate, most commonly Euribor and Libor. As these two base rates are also the 
most used ones in empirical research in finance in Europe, all loans with other base rates 
are excluded. Furthermore, the dataset needs to be corrected for availability of all varia-
bles, which provides a final sample of 1711 bank loans, of which 742 have Euribor as a 
base rate, thus are Euribor-denominated, and 969 have Libor as a base rate, thus are Libor-
denominated. Appendix 2 provides a detailed composition of the loan sample by country 
and industry. 
 
With a closer look at the sample, the difference between Euribor and Libor loans can be 
examined. Euribor loans are in most of the cases denominated in Euro and Libor loans 
denominated in other currencies, with British Pound and US Dollar being the most fre-
quently used. This is a key issue to explain possible differences in the interaction of the 
two base rates and the CSR variables. 
 
Information on corporate bonds is derived from Thomson Reuters Datastream and the 
data is composed of corporate bonds by non-financial firms from the aforementioned 
countries issued between 01.01.2003 and 31.12.2017. The initial dataset consists of 6106 
new bond issuances in this period, after matching this data with the companies for which 
ESG data is available, 1690 corporate bond issues remain. In order to have a complete 
sample where data on all variables is available, the final data sample is composed of 645 
bonds. Appendix 2 illustrates the final sample splitting it by country and industry.  
 
Information for firm-specific variables is derived from Thomson Reuters Worldscope da-
tabase, providing one of the largest datasets about financial information in the world. 
Exchange rates are derived from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB. Data for the 
yield of German government bonds is derived from the Deutsche Bank Eurosystem. The 
database calculates daily yields for government bonds with annual coupons with maturity 
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of 1 year until 30 years derived from the term structure of interest rates using the Svensson 
method (Svensson 1994) as suggested by Schich (1997). 
 
The final sample is presented in Appendix 2 and depicts it by splitting the data by country 
and by industry. Almost two thirds of Libor bank loans are from the United Kingdom, 
whereas Euribor loans are distributed more equally. As for corporate bonds, the largest 
share is held by France, suggesting that France is the largest European market for public 
debt. Industry-wise, the sample is split rather equally, providing some more information 
on which industries are more active in the private or public debt market. The most active 
industries in the public debt market are services, technology and manufacturing, whereas 
in the private debt market the bank loan issues are dominated by a broad range of indus-
tries. 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the four CSR scores by country and industry. 
In Panel A, the countries with the highest average scores are Austria, Finland, France and 
Hungary, and with the lowest average scores Denmark, Greece and Norway. Panel B 
presents the scores for industries. Industries with high average scores are Agriculture, 
Chemicals and Construction, whereas low ones are Healthcare, REITS and Wholesale. 
By taking a closer look at the environmental aspect, unsurprisingly the Oil and Gas in-
dustry is one of the lowest, whereas agriculture is the top, suggesting that in this industry 
firms have interest in applying strong environmental standards. By examining the gov-
ernance score, it is in both Panels the lowest of the four, which is in line with the results 
from Chapter 5. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by country and industry. 
  ESG score Environmental score Social score Governance score 
Panel A: Country     
Austria 85.40 85.77 84.02 55.13 
Belgium 75.98 77.08 68.33 59.42 
Denmark 59.51 67.87 68.77 39.26 
Finland 82.77 85.76 76.50 62.23 
France 82.00 84.97 84.43 62.63 
Germany 67.95 74.84 73.61 37.58 
Greece 32.99 41.68 57.86 16.23 
Hungary 89.33 92.80 92.90 50.40 
Ireland 67.38 64.47 59.58 71.81 
Italy 75.66 71.54 79.26 58.76 
Netherlands 77.49 73.29 77.99 63.85 
Norway 60.56 58.87 60.65 61.81 
Poland 68.63 73.78 72.50 41.18 
Portugal 74.27 86.51 82.62 27.95 
Spain 77.57 80.32 81.04 53.68 
Sweden 75.67 73.20 77.87 54.09 
Switzerland 76.25 73.69 77.43 65.91 
United Kingdom 70.53 63.02 68.02 74.99 
Total 73.46 72.25 74.14 61.55 
Panel B: Industry         
Aerospace and Defence 70.11 74.20 71.40 52.96 
Agriculture 91.22 89.27 91.59 84.15 
Automotive 73.41 75.79 75.46 58.45 
Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 76.23 77.63 76.96 58.23 
Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber 81.00 85.78 81.03 55.47 
Construction 82.66 82.98 82.88 63.72 
General Manufacturing 71.86 75.37 71.31 59.57 
Healthcare 68.64 66.60 69.84 47.89 
Entertainment & Leisure 69.37 65.05 70.86 67.05 
Mining 79.14 75.56 77.89 68.10 
Oil and Gas 71.96 62.72 74.35 66.24 
REITS 63.48 69.32 58.22 64.14 
Retail & Supermarkets 69.35 65.35 70.77 62.16 
Services 75.83 70.48 77.12 69.82 
Technology 72.50 69.05 74.32 62.27 
Transportation 73.38 69.80 70.66 67.86 
Wholesale 54.66 55.86 67.08 37.85 
Total 73.46 72.25 74.14 61.55 
 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
The methodology is based on two models, the model for the public debt market (i.e. cor-
porate bonds) and the private debt market (i.e. bank loans). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level in order to avoid outliers to significantly affect the 
estimation results (Goss and Roberts 2011; Oikonomou et al. 2014). For better 
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comparability, the same regression methods, pooled OLS regression, are used in both 
models, as has been done in previous research (Menz 2010; Oikonomou et al. 2014; 
Hoepner et al. 2014; Stellner et al. 2015). Pooled OLS regression is preferable if each 
observation is independent of any other, which is the case in bank loan and bond issu-
ances, as they are issued separately and not repeated periodically or in constant interval. 
All regression models are controlled for heteroscedasticity in the error terms by using 
White-Hinkley robust standard errors. 
 
The relationship between CSR and the cost of bank loans is examined with the following 
model (Goss and Roberts 2011; Kim et al. 2014; Bae et al. 2018), 
 
(2) 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾8 ∗
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾9 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾10 ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿11 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛿12 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿13 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿14 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿15 ∗
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿16 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 
 
where interestspreadi,j,t indicates the natural logarithm of the interest rate spread over the 
Euribor or Libor at time t for loan j by company i. Two separate models will be regressed 
for the two base rates. The interest spread is quoted in bps.  Spreads are log transformed 
due to positive skewness, since interest rates lower than the base rate are unlikely (Goss 
and Roberts 2011). CSR and firm-specific control variables are described in chapters 
4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. With regards to bank loan-specific control variables, 
loansizei,j,t is the natural logarithm of the loan amount in Euro, maturityi,j,t  the maturity 
of the loan in months, ratingi,j,t the long-term S&P rating of the loan at the time of issue, 
scaled from 0 (no rating, or SD rating) to 20 (AAA rating), for the transformation meth-
odology see Appendix 1. Securedi,j,t is a dummy variable for the status of the loan. If the 
loan is secured, the dummy variable equals 1, and 0 if it is unsecured. Loantypei,j,t is an 
indicator variable for the type of loan, such as Revolver, Bridge Loan and other loans. 
Term Loan is the omitted variable. Finally, loanpurposei,j,t indicates the purpose of the 
loan, which are working capital, acquisitions, back-ups and other purpose. General pur-
pose is the omitted variable. 
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To test the association between CSR and the yield spread of corporate bonds, the follow-
ing model, based on previous literature (Oikonomou et al. 2014; Ge and Liu 2015; Cooper 
and Uzun 2015), is used, 
 
(3) 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾6 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾8 ∗
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾9 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾10 ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿11 ∗
𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿12 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿13 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 
 
where yieldspreadi,j,t is the natural logarithm of the difference between the corporate bond 
yield and the German Treasury bond yield with comparable maturity (Ge and Liu 2015) 
at time t for bond j by company i. The German Treasury bond can be considered the safest 
sovereign bond in Europe and is used in different previous literature to measure yield 
spreads. (Blanco et al. 2005; Caporale et al. 2018) Spreads are log transformed due to 
positive skewness, since interest rates lower than the base rate are unlikely (Goss and 
Roberts 2011). CSR and firm-specific control variables are described in chapters 4.2.1 
and 4.2.2, respectively. In terms of bond specific control variables, issuesizei,j,t represents 
the natural logarithm of the par value of the issued bond in Euro, maturityi,j,t the number 
of months until maturity of the bond and ratingi,j,t the long-term S&P rating of the bond 
at the time of issue, scaled from 0 (no rating, or SD rating) to 20 (AAA rating), for the 
transformation methodology see Appendix 1. 
 
4.2.1. CSR control variables 
 
The ESG scores are based on a scale from 0-100. 100 indicates the highest score, thus 
perfect positive social responsibility, and vice versa. In another model in the empirical 
part, these scores are transformed into percentile ranks, as has been done in previous re-
search. (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Cheng et al. 2014; Stellner et al. 2015; La Rosa et 
al. 2018). In the research, all CSR control variables are lagged, as this information was 
the latest available at the time of the debt issue, similarly to previous research 
(Oikonomou et al. 2014; Stellner et al. 2015; Ge and Liu 2015). 
43 
 
 
 
ESGi,t-1: To proxy for the level of corporate social responsibility of a company, the overall 
ESG score is used and includes all different aspects of CSR. 
Envi,t-1: The Environmental score measures a firm’s attitude towards the environment and 
its management practice to avoid environmental risk. The score is based on the three main 
categories Emission Reduction, Product Innovation and Resource Reduction and are 
computed by several indicators.  
Soci,t-1: The Social score provides information about a company’s relationship with the 
society at large and is composed of the six pillars Employment Quality, Health & Safety, 
Training & Development, Diversity & Opportunity, Human Rights, Community, and 
Product Responsibility. 
Govi,t-1: The Corporate Governance score indicates the firm’s responsibility to govern-
ance, and is divided into Board Functions, Board Structure, Compensation Policy, Vision 
& Strategy, and Shareholder Rights. 
 
4.2.2. Firm-specific control variables  
 
All firm-specific control variables are euro-denominated and lagged, as this information 
was the latest available at the time of the debt issue, similarly to previous research 
(Oikonomou et al. 2014; Stellner et al. 2015; Ge and Liu 2015). To control for company 
characteristics that are expected to have an impact on the cost of debt, following variables 
are used in the methodology, size i,t-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets, leveragei,t-1 
indicates the level of leverage of the company, calculated as total debt divided by total 
assets, profitabilityi,t-1 is measured by the return on total assets, MTBi,t-1 is the market-to-
book ratio, int_covi,t-1 is the interest coverage ratio, EBIT divided by interest expenses, 
representing a company’s ability to pay interests by its earnings, and sales_growthi,t-1 is 
the sales growth in percentage over the financial year. 
 
Industry fixed effects: To control for industry-specific characteristics, dummies for the 
different sectors are included. 
Year fixed effects: Years are fixed covering the period 2003 to 2017 to control for time-
varying effects as interest rates and yields differ throughout the periods. 
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Country fixed effects: Country-specific effects are fixed to control for cross-sectional ef-
fects. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In the period 2003 to 2017, Figure 1 provides evidence that firms attitude toward social 
responsibility improved, as scores in all four classes increased in that time significantly. 
The financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 had no negative impact on the social responsibility 
effort of companies, suggesting that although firm’s profit did suffer from these turbulent 
times, they continued their path to implement higher social norms in their firm culture. 
Although in the period 2010 to 2014, where European countries still suffered from the 
post-financial crisis effects and the European Sovereign debt crisis emerged, scores re-
mained stable without continuing the rise from the previous years. From 2015 on, CSR 
scores started to increase again reaching the peak throughout the sample period. 
 
Figure 1. ESG score evolution. 
 
 
 
The environmental and social aspects have higher average scores than the governance 
aspect, suggesting that these two enjoy greater attention and importance by companies. 
This might be explained by the fact that corporates expect greater advantage from the 
environmental and social perspective than from the latter one. The empirical analysis 
might give answers as smaller impact of the governance pillar on the cost of debt would 
confirm the lack of attention. 
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5.1. Model for bank loans 
 
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that 742 Euribor-denominated and 969 Libor-
denominated bank loans are examined. Euribor loans have an average spread of 137bps, 
17% of the loans are secured with a mean maturity of 55 months. Libor loans are charac-
terized by an average spread of 173 bps, which is consistent with prior literature (Goss 
and Roberts 2011; Bae et al. 2018). On average, Euribor loans have a lower spread than 
Libor loans, lower ESG scores, shorter maturity and better credit ratings. In general, it 
can be concluded that variables of the two base rates differ and suggests examining them 
separately continuously throughout the empirical research.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for bank loans. 
  EURIBOR   LIBOR 
Variable N Mean Median Min Max S.D.   N Mean Median Min Max S.D. 
Panel A: ESG characteristics            
ESG score 742 68.96 81.96 3.85 97.42 28.06  969 68.87 76.91 3.91 98.08 25.47 
Environmental score 742 72.92 86.55 8.67 97.39 26.45  969 63.47 70.49 8.74 97.37 26.70 
Social score 742 71.79 84.13 4.74 99.25 26.40  969 67.69 73.45 6.52 98.60 23.70 
Governance score 742 49.04 48.87 1.97 96.30 26.49  969 67.31 74.01 2.63 96.45 24.06 
Panel B: Loan characteristics            
Spread (bps) 742 137.0 90.0 5.0 1600.0 147.6  969 173.4 140.0 11.5 1100.0 141.2 
Loan size 742 20.13 20.21 15.07 24.31 1.35  969 19.88 19.87 15.07 23.85 1.38 
Maturity 742 54.59 59.00 3.00 323.00 24.19  969 50.77 59.00 4.00 143.00 22.06 
S&P Rating 742 6.61 8.00 0.00 18.00 6.29  969 4.36 0.00 0.00 17.00 5.67 
Secured loan 742 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37  969 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 
Panel C: Firm characteristics            
Firm size 742 15.98 15.98 11.85 19.74 1.26  969 15.31 15.15 11.78 19.47 1.50 
Leverage 742 31.49 30.19 0.29 116.54 15.71  969 27.67 27.04 0.00 108.71 15.74 
Return on Assets (%) 742 5.63 5.00 -14.94 75.92 6.43  969 6.61 6.12 -53.22 100.83 10.29 
Market/Book 742 2.42 1.96 -13.47 19.66 2.44  969 2.13 2.01 -110.53 56.62 8.62 
Interest Coverage (%) 742 8.87 4.63 -29.36 881.00 37.47  969 29.18 4.96 -84.06 5563 259.44 
Sales growth (%) 742 8.04 5.76 -42.80 276.21 23.56  969 35.65 6.07 -48.20 23319 749.37 
This table reports the summary statistics for Euribor-denominated and Libor-denominated bank loans, respectively. 
Panel A provides information about the overall ESG score and its three pillars, Panel B a summary of loan-specific 
variables and Panel C variables used to control for firm characteristics. 
 
 
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for bank loans. The issue of multicollinearity 
arises if variables are highly correlated and thereby could bias regression results. In Panels 
A and B, the high correlation between the ESG score and the three sub-aspects Environ-
mental, Social and Governance is expected, as the overall score is based on the three 
pillars. Thus, separate regressions will be conducted for the overall score and the three 
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sub-scores. The correlation between the three ESG components is in comparison smaller 
and should not cause problems of multicollinearity. For sake of validity, besides combin-
ing the three pillars in one model, separate models will be examined consisting of only 
one of these three. Evaluating the correlation between the CSR measures and the spread, 
the overall ESG score and the categories Environmental and Social have a negative rela-
tionship with the spread, suggesting that higher CSR rating decreases the interest rate.  
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for bank loans. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Panel A: EURIBOR                
ESG score (1) 1.00               
Environmental score (2) 0.86 1.00              
Social score (3) 0.88 0.74 1.00             
Governance score (4) 0.71 0.50 0.52 1.00            
Spread (5) -0.11 -0.14 -0.10 0.01 1.00           
Loan size (6) 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.15 -0.33 1.00          
Maturity (7) 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.15 -0.17 1.00         
Rating (8) 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.08 -0.31 0.42 -0.18 1.00        
Secured loan (9) 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.42 -0.14 0.20 -0.19 1.00       
Firm size (10) 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.27 -0.29 0.60 -0.16 0.49 -0.16 1.00      
Leverage (11) 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.16 -0.07 0.07 -0.10 0.17 0.03 1.00     
Return on Assets (12) 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.12 -0.12 1.00    
Market/Book (13) -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.15 0.05 0.18 1.00   
Interest Coverage (14) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.12 0.08 1.00  
Sales growth (15) -0.12 -0.11 -0.19 -0.06 0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.02 0.13 -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.02 1.00 
Panel B: LIBOR                
ESG score (1) 1.00               
Environmental score (2) 0.81 1.00              
Social score (3) 0.86 0.67 1.00             
Governance score (4) 0.63 0.32 0.44 1.00            
Spread (5) -0.13 -0.09 -0.12 0.05 1.00           
Loan size (6) 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.04 -0.31 1.00          
Maturity (7) -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.14 -0.10 1.00         
Rating (8) 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.10 -0.22 0.42 -0.05 1.00        
Secured loan (9) -0.15 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 0.38 -0.14 0.29 -0.10 1.00       
Firm size (10) 0.44 0.48 0.43 0.10 -0.30 0.64 -0.10 0.54 -0.13 1.00      
Leverage (11) -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.08 1.00     
Return on Assets (12) -0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.21 1.00    
Market/Book (13) 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.03 1.00   
Interest Coverage (14) -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07 -0.16 0.34 0.01 1.00  
Sales growth (15) -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
This table reports the correlation coefficients for all variables. In Panel A, all bank loans with the base rate Euribor, 
and in Panel B with the base rate Libor are reported. 
 
 
The relationship between the interest rate spread and loan size, rating, firm size, market-
to-book ratio and interest coverage is negative, featuring that larger loans by larger 
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companies with higher rating, higher market-to-book ratio and higher interest coverage 
should result in lower interest rates. Furthermore, the positive correlation between spread 
and maturity, secured status and leverage suggests that loans that are secured with longer 
maturity and higher leverage result in higher interest rates. These findings are in line with 
prior studies (Goss and Roberts 2011) and are similar for Euribor and Libor bank loans. 
 
Table 4 reports empirical results of the regression for interest rate spreads on bank loans 
with Euribor and Libor base rate. For Euribor-denominated loans, model (1) reports that 
overall ESG scores have a negative sign and are statistically significant, thus strong social 
responsibility within a firm decreases the interest rate. Due to the logarithmic transfor-
mation of the interest rate spread, the interpretation is indirect. If the independent variable 
changes by 1 with all other variables remaining constant, the dependent variable percent-
age change is the exponent of the coefficient minus 1, thus %∆y=100*(eβ-1), as has been 
used in prior research (Oikonomou et al. 2014). 
 
Using this approach and holding all other variables equal, if the overall ESG score of the 
company increases by 10 points, for example from 75 to 85, then the interest spread is 
expected to decrease by 4.9%. Models (3) and (4) can be interpreted similarly, where a 
10-point increase of the Environmental score lowers the spread by 3.9% and the same 
increase of the Social score decreases the spread by 3.7%.  These two aspects seem to 
lose their significance in model (2) where the three scores are combined in one regression, 
although the social score is significant at the 10% level. The Governance responsibility 
score has no impact on loan spreads, neither in model (2) and (5). In all the models of 
Euribor-denominated loans the control variables have similar coefficients and signifi-
cance. In general, larger loans, higher S&P rating, shorter maturity and unsecured loans 
lower the interest rate. Furthermore, larger firms with lower leverage, higher market-to-
book and higher interest coverage pay less for their loans. The adjusted R-squares be-
tween 67% and 68% as well as the general findings are similar to Goss and Roberts (2011) 
and Kim et al. (2014). 
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Table 4. ESG scores and interest rate spreads. 
      EURIBOR 
     LIBOR     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ESG characteristics:            
ESG score -0.0049***      0.0004     
 (-4.572)      (0.467)     
Environmental score  -0.0024 -0.0039***     0.0001 0.0005   
 
 (-1.563) (-3.274)     (0.094) (0.604)   
Social score  -0.0024*  -0.0037***    -0.0004  0.0004  
 
 (-1.674)  (-3.466)    (-0.329)  (0.491)  
Governance score  0.0005   -0.0016   0.0019*   0.0017* 
 
 (0.339)   (-1.33)   (1.665)   (1.735) 
Loan characteristics:            
Loan size -0.0916*** -0.0955*** -0.0935*** -0.0946*** -0.0889***  -0.0426** -0.0397* -0.0427** -0.0429** -0.0402** 
 
(-3.053) (-3.158) (-3.092) (-3.116) (-2.881)  (-2.105) (-1.953) (-2.107) (-2.119) (-1.984) 
Maturity 0.1543** 0.1533** 0.1506** 0.1491** 0.1375**  0.0687 0.0687 0.0683 0.0698 0.0696 
 
(2.354) (2.321) (2.274) (2.244) (2.029)  (1.454) (1.455) (1.443) (1.48) (1.48) 
S&P Rating -0.0396*** -0.0402*** -0.0409*** -0.0397*** -0.0405***  -0.0178*** -0.0185*** -0.0177*** -0.0176*** -0.0184*** 
 
(-6.952) (-6.989) (-7.115) (-6.884) (-6.935)  (-3.639) (-3.795) (-3.629) (-3.592) (-3.802) 
Secured loan 0.4266*** 0.414*** 0.4007*** 0.4175*** 0.3922***  0.4513*** 0.4481*** 0.4496*** 0.4507*** 0.4473*** 
 
(4.635) (4.516) (4.383) (4.566) (4.353)  (7.909) (7.88) (7.868) (7.892) (7.872) 
Firm characteristics:            
Firm size -0.059 -0.0666* -0.0714** -0.0774** -0.1033***  -0.1695*** -0.1717*** -0.1704*** -0.1696*** -0.1734*** 
 
(-1.634) (-1.831) (-1.97) (-2.203) (-2.975)  (-7.208) (-7.315) (-7.417) (-7.232) (-7.782) 
Leverage 0.0085*** 0.0088*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0091***  0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 
 (4.271) (4.474) (4.479) (4.423) (4.481)  (4.349) (4.463) (4.393) (4.324) (4.427) 
Return on Assets (%) -0.0054 -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0075 -0.008  -0.0132*** -0.0132*** -0.0131*** -0.0132*** -0.0133*** 
 (-0.953) (-1.31) (-1.332) (-1.361) (-1.442)  (-5.132) (-5.206) (-5.097) (-5.135) (-5.209) 
Market/Book -0.0299** -0.0307** -0.0308** -0.0308** -0.0312**  -0.0163*** -0.0161*** -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0162*** 
 (-2.284) (-2.347) (-2.368) (-2.329) (-2.317)  (-3.052) (-3.059) (-3.041) (-3.047) (-3.076) 
Interest Coverage (%) -0.0093*** -0.0094*** -0.0094*** -0.0095*** -0.0096***  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 
(-5.354) (-5.505) (-5.519) (-5.557) (-5.638)  (-1.852) (-1.884) (-1.857) (-1.844) (-1.872) 
Sales growth (%) -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003  0.001 0.0011 0.001 0.001 0.0011* 
 (-0.193) (-0.102) (0.177) (-0.274) (0.147)  (1.517) (1.632) (1.564) (1.52) (1.662) 
Fixed effects:            
Loan Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Intercept 6.7481*** 6.9443*** 6.9392*** 7.0339*** 7.1492***  7.2356*** 7.1604*** 7.2455*** 7.2399*** 7.1873*** 
 (9.976) (10.108) (10.288) (10.406) (10.262)  (13.794) (13.473) (13.73) (13.817) (13.896) 
            
R2 0.7102 0.7075 0.7064 0.7064 0.7023  0.6620 0.6631 0.6620 0.6620 0.6630 
Adjusted R2 0.6800 0.6760 0.6757 0.6757 0.6713  0.6360 0.6364 0.6361 0.6360 0.6372 
N 742 742 742 742 742   969 969 969 969 969 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of interest rate spreads over Euribor and Libor, respectively. Models 
(1) use the overall ESG score as an independent variable, Models (2) the three pillars environmental, social and gov-
ernance combined, and Models (3) – (5) use only one of these in each. All models are controlled for heteroskedasticity 
by using White-Hinkley robust standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote the signif-
icance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
For Libor-denominated interest rate spreads, corporate social responsibility seems to have 
no significant impact on the cost of debt. Examining the overall ESG, Environmental and 
Social score, these variables are statistically not significant. The Governance aspect is 
significant at 10% in models (7) and (10) and is positive. This indicates that firms with 
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higher Governance responsibility pay more for their bank loans, suggesting that banks 
penalize the firm for overinvesting in this pillar. The control variables provide similar 
results like the Euribor loans, except that return on assets is significant and has a negative 
relationship. Thus, more profitable firms pay a lower interest rate. The adjusted R-squares 
of around 63% are slightly lower than in the Euribor models. 
 
The findings suggest that Euribor loans seem to satisfy the first hypothesis as higher CSR 
scores, except the Governance score, decrease the interest rate. The insignificance of the 
governance aspect can be explained by the lack of attention by firms as shown in Figure 
1. For Libor loans, there appears to be no significant relationship between CSR and inter-
est rates, and the first hypothesis is rejected. 
 
The mixed results for Euribor and Libor loans provide new information as this has not 
been researched previously. It appears as if CSR is present in the Eurozone loan market, 
where loans are most often issued in Euro with Euribor as the base rate, whereas this 
information is not incorporated in the loan market of other currencies in Europe, specifi-
cally US Dollar, Pound Sterling, Swiss Franc and Swedish Krona. This finding is new in 
the empirical research as no previous literature has tested whether Euribor and Libor as 
base rates influence the impact of CSR on bank loans. Although a few papers focus on 
similarities and differences of these two interbank rates (Eisl et al. 2017), they do not 
mention any potential linkage to social responsibility. 
 
In Table 5, ESG scores are divided into top and low quantiles by creating dummy varia-
bles. If the score is in the top 25% of the sample, then the variable High score equals 1, 
and 0 otherwise. The same is applicable for the Low score variable, which is 1 if the ESG 
score is in the lowest 25% of the sample. This procedure is followed to examine whether 
banks incorporate if companies have very low or very high social responsibility. In case 
of the Euribor loans, models (1) to (5) report results of the impact of the lowest and top 
CSR scores and its impact on the interest rate spread. In model (1) it can be interpreted 
that top CSR companies pay 15.38% less on their bank loans than others, and the bottom 
pays 10.95% more. For the three pillars, models (2) to (5) suggest that high scores of all 
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three aspects decrease the spread by up to 30%, and low scores of the environmental 
aspect increase the spread. 
 
Table 5. High and low ESG scores and interest rate spreads. 
  
  EURIBOR      LIBOR   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ESG characteristics:            
High ESC score -0.167***      -0.1136**     
 
(-2.945)      (-2.206)     
Low ESG score 0.116*      -0.0747     
 
(1.786)      (-1.558)     
High Environmental score  -0.1066* -0.1692***     0.051 0.0375   
 
 (-1.664) (-2.649)     (0.95) (0.722)   
Low Environmental score  0.1515** 0.1279**     0.0357 -0.0101   
 
 (2.106) (1.977)     (0.65) (-0.208)   
High Social score  -0.28***  -0.3107***    -0.0574  -0.0185  
 
 (-4.564)  (-5.246)    (-1.025)  (-0.351)  
Low Social score  -0.1134*  -0.062    -0.0449  -0.0682  
 
 (-1.656)  (-0.991)    (-0.859)  (-1.486)  
High Governance score  -0.1106*   -0.1361**   0.1807***   0.1736*** 
 
 (-1.82)   (-2.194)   (3.519)   (3.649) 
Low Governance score  -0.1078   -0.0475   0.0224   0.0161 
 
 (-1.485)   (-0.698)   (0.43)   (0.314) 
Loan characteristics:            
Loan size -0.09*** -0.0843*** -0.0894*** -0.0814*** -0.093***  -0.047** -0.0443** -0.0423** -0.045** -0.0444** 
 
(-2.946) (-2.835) (-2.92) (-2.705) (-3.033)  (-2.305) (-2.199) (-2.067) (-2.217) (-2.216) 
Maturity 0.1497** 0.1318** 0.1463** 0.126* 0.1361**  0.0753 0.0677 0.0673 0.0706 0.0696 
 
(2.248) (2.094) (2.216) (1.96) (2.021)  (1.587) (1.446) (1.417) (1.495) (1.497) 
S&P Rating -0.0389*** -0.0411*** -0.0415*** -0.0412*** -0.0392***  -0.0174*** -0.0196*** -0.0181*** -0.0178*** -0.0188*** 
 
(-6.771) (-7.278) (-7.238) (-7.237) (-6.708)  (-3.615) (-4.024) (-3.698) (-3.624) (-3.912) 
Secured loan 0.4092*** 0.3631*** 0.3732*** 0.3808*** 0.3837***  0.4522*** 0.4586*** 0.4482*** 0.4464*** 0.462*** 
 
(4.46) (4.118) (4.178) (4.32) (4.26)  (8.016) (8.074) (7.856) (7.829) (8.112) 
Firm characteristics:            
Firm size -0.0761** -0.0666* -0.0685* -0.0949*** -0.1112***  -0.1607*** -0.1701*** -0.1699*** -0.171*** -0.1723*** 
 
(-2.135) (-1.866) (-1.924) (-2.758) (-3.203)  (-7.101) (-7.438) (-7.501) (-7.554) (-7.9) 
Leverage 0.009*** 0.0101*** 0.009*** 0.0103*** 0.0091***  0.0064*** 0.0068*** 0.0066*** 0.0064*** 0.0068*** 
 
(4.461) (5.161) (4.545) (5.188) (4.431)  (4.262) (4.62) (4.433) (4.28) (4.573) 
Return on Assets (%) -0.0069 -0.0082 -0.0076 -0.0097* -0.008  -0.013*** -0.0134*** -0.013*** -0.0134*** -0.0134*** 
 
(-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.352) (-1.841) (-1.451)  (-5.016) (-5.211) (-5.057) (-5.233) (-5.204) 
Market/Book -0.0297** -0.032** -0.0295** -0.031** -0.0325**  -0.0158*** -0.0172*** -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0174*** 
 
(-2.228) (-2.502) (-2.243) (-2.428) (-2.43)  (-2.928) (-3.186) (-3.056) (-3.047) (-3.236) 
Interest Coverage (%) -0.0093*** -0.0096*** -0.0093*** -0.0102*** -0.0093***  -0.0011** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.0009* 
 
(-5.634) (-6.404) (-5.624) (-6.484) (-5.69)  (-2.022) (-1.68) (-1.861) (-1.824) (-1.686) 
Sales growth (%) 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 0 0.0001  0.001 0.0011* 0.001 0.001 0.0011* 
 
(0.055) (-0.165) (0.123) (0.017) (0.058)  (1.576) (1.705) (1.556) (1.601) (1.775) 
Fixed effects:            
Loan Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Intercept 6.6982*** 6.7584*** 6.6361*** 7.0601*** 7.3041***  7.2153*** 7.3539*** 7.2564*** 7.3641*** 7.3764*** 
 (9.349) (9.794) (9.519) (10.421) (10.439)  (13.616) (13.303) (13.251) (13.783) (14.061) 
            
R2 0.7071 0.7193 0.7077 0.7135 0.7037  0.6644 0.6679 0.6622 0.6626 0.6670 
Adjusted R2 0.6760 0.6877 0.6767 0.6832 0.6723  0.6383 0.6404 0.6358 0.6363 0.6410 
N 742 742 742 742 742   969 969 969 969 969 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of interest rate spreads over Euribor and Libor, respectively. Models 
(1) use the highest and lowest quantile of the overall ESG score as independent variables, Models (2) the highest and 
lowest quantiles of the three pillars environmental, social and governance combined, and Models (3) – (5) use only one 
of these in each. All models are controlled for heteroskedasticity by using White-Hinkley robust standard errors. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
52 
 
 
 
As for Libor-denominated bank loans, only the variable high ESG score and high gov-
ernance score are statistically significant. The first has the expected coefficient, whereas 
firms in the top 25% of governance responsibility pay around 16.50% more on their in-
terest rate, which is an opposing result to the Euribor models. In both models, the “gov-
ernance paradox” as described by Erragragui (2018) holds and is consistent with the find-
ings by Erragragui (2018). 
 
The results of Table 5 for strong and poor CSR performance generally confirm the find-
ings from Table 4, as for Euribor loans positive social responsibility lowers the interest 
rate, and Libor loans in most models have no significant relationship with ESG scores. 
 
5.2. Model for corporate bonds 
 
The summary statistics of the corporate bond sample is shown in Table 6, where the over-
all ESG score and the Environmental and Social pillar appear to be on a same level, 
whereas the Governance score is almost 20 points lower.  
 
Table 6. Summary statistics for corporate bonds. 
Variable N Mean Median Min Max S.D. 
Panel A: ESG characteristics      
ESG score 686 85.33 91.47 7.03 97.03 16.36 
Environmental score 686 84.71 91.18 8.84 95.60 16.45 
Social score 686 86.22 92.11 7.17 97.59 15.54 
Governance score 686 67.19 71.43 7.69 97.94 21.98 
Panel B: Bond characteristics      
Spread (bps) 686 148.79 121.59 -203.00 1577.91 135.52 
Bond size 686 12.91 13.12 8.89 14.91 0.90 
Maturity 686 120.63 96.00 12.00 1200.00 109.98 
S&P Rating 686 4.86 0.00 0.00 17.00 6.44 
Panel C: Firm characteristics      
Firm size 686 16.69 16.78 12.03 19.66 1.39 
Leverage 686 29.72 28.12 0.01 150.26 13.89 
Return on Assets (%) 686 5.55 4.95 -21.55 51.02 6.01 
Market/Book 686 3.32 2.10 -40.04 235.02 14.68 
Interest Coverage (%) 686 10.55 5.81 -31.44 288.67 22.71 
Sales growth (%) 686 7.60 2.86 -29.85 2750.40 105.40 
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The average spread of 149 bps is comparable with the bank loan spread, and in line with 
previous research (Ge and Liu 2015). The mean maturity is 120 months, or 10 years, 
which is significantly longer than for bank loans. 
 
Table 7 reports the correlation matrix of key variables used in the analysis. The correla-
tion between the overall ESG score and its pillars is as expected strongly positively cor-
related, to control for multicollinearity separate regressions will be conducted. The cor-
relation between the three ESG components is smaller and should not cause problems of 
multicollinearity. Nevertheless, in addition to combining these three, separate models will 
be regressed including only one of the three. The correlation between the CSR scores and 
the spread is mostly negative, except for Governance, which is in line with the expectation 
that high social responsibility decreases the cost of public debt. Additionally, the yield 
spread correlates negatively with the bond size, the S&P rating, firm size, return on assets 
and interest coverage, and positive with leverage, which is all consistent with the predic-
tions and prior research results (Ge and Liu 2015). 
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix for corporate bonds. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
ESG score (1) 1.00              
Env score (2) 0.82 1.00             
Soc score (3) 0.89 0.75 1.00            
Gov score (4) 0.67 0.42 0.48 1.00           
spread (5) -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 0.03 1.00          
Bond size (6) 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.20 -0.11 1.00         
Maturity (7) 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.13 1.00        
S&P rating (8) 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.09 -0.24 0.21 0.09 1.00       
Firm size (9) 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.27 -0.18 0.47 0.25 0.32 1.00      
Leverage (10) -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 1.00     
Return on Assets (11) 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.26 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.14 0.02 1.00    
Market/Book (12) -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 0.11 0.18 1.00   
Interest Coverage (13) 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.01 -0.21 -0.36 0.34 0.03 1.00  
Sales growth (14) -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.14 0.00 0.03 1.00 
 
 
The regression results in Table 8 provide findings on the impact of CSR on yields of 
corporate bonds.  Although the overall ESG score has a negative coefficient, thus seems 
to decrease the yield, it is statistically not significant. Examining the three ESG compo-
nents on the other hand provide insights. If combining the pillars, higher environmental 
scores decrease, whereas higher governance scores increase the yield spread. Splitting 
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these three aspects in models (3) to (5) show that stronger environmental and social re-
sponsibility decrease, and stronger governance responsibility increases the cost of debt. 
Based on the results in Table 8 it can be concluded that lenders value a company’s envi-
ronmental and social engagement and reward them with cheaper debt financing, but pun-
ish companies investing into governance responsibility as it may be seen as unnecessary 
costs that do not add any value to the company. 
 
Table 8. ESG scores and yield spreads. 
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
ESG characteristics:      
ESG score -0.0038     
 (-1.309)     
Environmental score  -0.0063** -0.0065***   
 
 (-1.975) (-2.803)   
Social score  -0.0051 
 -0.0057*  
 
 (-1.214) 
 (-1.747)  
Governance score  0.0057*** 
 
 0.0024 
 
 (2.766) 
 
 (1.207) 
Loan characteristics:      
Bond size -0.0965** -0.0996** -0.0983** -0.0953** -0.1036** 
 (-2.003) (-2.068) (-2.025) (-1.975) (-2.139) 
Maturity -0.0094 0.0182 0.0047 -0.0056 -0.0133 
 (-0.132) (0.262) (0.066) (-0.08) (-0.189) 
S&P Rating -0.0155* -0.0155* -0.0156* -0.0159** -0.0154* 
 (-1.914) (-1.953) (-1.937) (-1.967) (-1.9) 
Firm characteristics:      
Firm size 0.0189 0.0376 0.0364 0.0265 -0.0114 
 (0.469) (0.941) (0.897) (0.654) (-0.314) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.0023 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0019 
 (-0.525) (-0.606) (-0.522) (-0.568) (-0.486) 
Return on Assets (%) -0.039*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0384*** -0.0429*** 
 (-4.205) (-4.255) (-4.231) (-4.157) (-4.73) 
Market/Book 0.0223* 0.0224* 0.0222* 0.0225* 0.0224* 
 (1.898) (1.907) (1.887) (1.912) (1.935) 
Interest Coverage (%) -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0013 
 (-0.469) (-0.103) (-0.416) (-0.395) (-0.477) 
Sales growth (%) -0.0032 -0.003 -0.0037 -0.0032 -0.0019 
 (-0.897) (-0.867) (-1.047) (-0.896) (-0.531) 
Fixed effects:      
Bond Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Intercept 4.8482*** 4.8468*** 4.8587*** 4.75*** 5.0305*** 
 (3.827) (3.977) (3.844) (3.731) (4.008) 
      
R2 0.3793 0.3929 0.3840 0.3818 0.3786 
Adjusted R2 0.3155 0.3283 0.3208 0.3183 0.3147 
N 444 444 444 444 444 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yield spreads over German Treasury bonds. Model (1) uses the 
overall ESG score as an independent variable, Model (2) the three pillars environmental, social and governance com-
bined, and Models (3) – (5) use only one of these in each. All models are controlled for heteroskedasticity by using 
White-Hinkley robust standard errors. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9 examines the implication of high and low corporate responsibility on the yield of 
corporate bonds. Comparable to Table 5, companies with high scores are in the top 25%, 
and low scores are in the bottom 25% of the sample. Model (1) implies that public lenders 
seem not to value very high responsibility, as the coefficient is positive, but not signifi-
cant. Poor responsibility performance on the other hand strongly increases the yield 
spread, with a coefficient of 0.1898 being significant at 5%. Thus, if companies overall 
ESG score is in the lowest quartile, they pay 19% more on the yield spread than the rest. 
As for the sub-categories, companies with a high environmental score pay 17% to 19% 
less and with a low score around 14% more. With respect to the social component, high 
scores have a negative coefficient, but only at a 10% significance level in model (4). 
 
Interesting enough, the governance aspects has the exact opposite impact than all other 
pillars. High governance responsibility significantly increases the yield spread by around 
18% and provides similar results like the Libor bank loans in Table 5. The “governance 
paradox” by Erragrui (2018) is present in this model as strong performance impacts the 
yield whereas poor performance has no statistically significant impact. 
 
As a result, companies with very high environmental and social responsibility perfor-
mance pay lower yield spread, and firms with a low overall ESG score, low environmental 
score and high governance score pay higher yields on their bonds. As the loan and firm 
control variables report similar results to Table 8, it will not be discussed in more detail. 
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Table 9. High and low ESG scores and yield spreads. 
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
ESG characteristics:      
High ESC score 0.0174     
 (0.207)     
Low ESG score 0.1898**     
 (2.154)     
High Environmental score  -0.1744** -0.1927**   
 
 (-1.99) (-2.246)   
Low Environmental score  0.1276 0.1452*   
 
 (1.329) (1.653)   
High Social score  -0.11  -0.1647*  
 
 (-1.241)  (-1.866)  
Low Social score  0.1048  0.1229  
 
 (1.131)  (1.342)  
High Governance score  0.1875**   0.1773* 
 
 (2.175)   (1.961) 
Low Governance score  -0.0547   0.0329 
 
 (-0.605)   (0.382) 
Loan characteristics:      
Bond size -0.0886* -0.0702 -0.0785 -0.0867* -0.0977** 
 (-1.825) (-1.444) (-1.6) (-1.8) (-2.033) 
Maturity -0.0024 0.0031 -0.0121 -0.0091 -0.0022 
 (-0.033) (0.045) (-0.173) (-0.129) (-0.031) 
S&P Rating -0.016** -0.0159** -0.0162** -0.0162** -0.0146* 
 (-1.969) (-2.007) (-2.038) (-2.009) (-1.813) 
Firm characteristics:      
Firm size 0.0144 0.0221 0.0269 0.0144 -0.0121 
 (0.382) (0.556) (0.664) (0.373) (-0.338) 
Leverage -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0013 
 (-0.477) (-0.424) (-0.58) (-0.476) (-0.346) 
Return on Assets (%) -0.0384*** -0.0381*** -0.0396*** -0.0385*** -0.0418*** 
 (-4.137) (-4.248) (-4.408) (-4.198) (-4.558) 
Market/Book 0.021* 0.021* 0.0214* 0.0219* 0.0224* 
 (1.775) (1.876) (1.873) (1.917) (1.942) 
Interest Coverage (%) -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.002 -0.0011 -0.0014 
 (-0.534) (-0.518) (-0.728) (-0.391) (-0.501) 
Sales growth (%) -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0022 
 (-0.94) (-1.075) (-1.046) (-1.045) (-0.626) 
Fixed effects:      
Bond Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Intercept 4.3887*** 4.0455*** 4.4087*** 4.2438*** 4.8784*** 
 (3.416) (3.129) (3.391) (3.179) (3.889) 
      
R2 0.3811 0.3975 0.3869 0.3853 0.3817 
Adjusted R2 0.3164 0.3299 0.3227 0.3210 0.3170 
N 645 645 645 645 645 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of yield spreads over German Treasury bonds. Model (1) uses the 
highest and lowest quantile of the overall ESG score as independent variables, Model (2) the highest and lowest quan-
tiles of the three pillars environmental, social and governance combined, and Models (3) – (5) use only one of these in 
each. All models are controlled for heteroskedasticity by using White-Hinkley robust standard errors. T-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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5.3. Relationship between bank loans and corporate bonds 
 
To answer Hypothesis 2, this chapter investigates whether corporate social responsibility 
has an asymmetric impact on the private (bank loans) and the public (corporate bonds) 
debt market. By comparing the results in Table 4 and Table 8, similarities between the 
impact of CSR on private and public debt can be examined. Although for the overall ESG 
score the coefficient is negative for Euribor loans and positive for Libor loans, it is statis-
tically not significant for latter. The same coefficient in the corporate bond model is neg-
ative, although not significant. This suggests that overall CSR of a firm is only incorpo-
rated in bank loans and only for those with Euribor as base rate. Regarding the environ-
mental component, Euribor loans and corporate bonds seem to react similar, both coeffi-
cients being negative, whereas for Libor loans it is not significant. This same relationship 
can be examined by the impact of the social score. The governance aspect is opposed to 
all previous linkages, as the coefficient in the models for corporate bonds and Libor loans 
is positive and significant, and not significant for Euribor loans. Further investigating in 
Table 5 and Table 9 the relationship between high and low ESG scores and the cost of 
debt, the previous linkage is confirmed. Euribor loans and corporate bonds react similar 
on the overall ESG score, the environmental and the social pillar, and Libor loans and 
corporate bonds on the governance pillar. 
 
To conclude, the overall ESG, the environmental and the social score has comparable 
impact on Euribor loans and corporate bonds, and the governance pillar comparable link-
age of Libor loans and corporate bonds. These findings suggest that although specific 
components are incorporated different by private and public lenders, in general both debt 
markets behave similar with regards to information about corporate social responsibility. 
Thus, hypothesis 2, that CSR has asymmetric impact on bank loans and corporate bonds, 
is rejected. Although the hypothesis is not formally tested, it is a conclusion of the com-
parison between the regression models for bank loans and corporate bonds and the rejec-
tion is based on these results. Considering other control variables, loan and bond size, 
rating and return on assets have negative relationship with both spreads, whereas the re-
lationship between other variables and the two debt markets diminishes.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility has its roots from the 1950s, gradually increasing its im-
portance in the financial markets and experiencing strong growth throughout the last dec-
ade. Numerous CSR guidelines by institutions like the United Nations, OECD and Euro-
pean Union highlight this statement, trying to regulate the SRI trend, that doubled in in-
vestment volume in four years. 
 
This thesis examines the impact of corporate social responsibility on the cost of private 
(i.e. bank loans) and public (i.e. corporate bonds) debt by investigating non-financial 
listed companies from 18 European countries in the 15-year period 2003 – 2017, covering 
1711 bank loans, of which 742 are Euribor-denominated and 969 Libor-denominated, and 
645 corporate bonds. Previous research suggests that there is a relationship between CSR 
and bank loans as well as corporate bonds. Preceding literature provides contradicting 
results, as some find that better responsibility decreases the cost of debt, confirming the 
risk mitigation theory, and others conclude that higher CSR increases interest rates, 
thereby confirming the overinvestment theory. 
 
The impact is estimated by a pooled regression using OLS and provides new findings that 
in general align with previous research. By first examining Euribor-denominated bank 
loans it can be concluded that better performance of overall CSR, the environmental and 
the social pillar decrease the interest rate spread by on average 4% with a 10-point in-
crease in the respective score, if all other variables held equal. A 10-point change is of 
higher explanatory power than a 1-point change, due to a score scale of 0 to 100. After 
examining the top and bottom CSR performing loans, high scores in all four categories 
decrease the interest rate spread significantly, with the social score having the largest 
impact by lowering the cost by 30%. Low scores of the aspects ESG and environmental 
increase the spread, whereas the other aspects lose significance, thereby confirming the 
presence of the risk mitigation theory.  
 
In a next step, the relationship between CSR and Libor loans diminishes as only the gov-
ernance component is significant, and higher scores increase the spread. Investigating 
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high and low scores as in the Euribor model, top ESG scores decrease, and high govern-
ance scores increase the interest rates spread, showing that investing in the governance 
aspect is seen as unnecessary costs. All other CSR variables are not significant.  
 
With regards to the public corporate debt market, yield spreads on corporate bonds are 
examined, showing that strong performance of the overall ESG, the environmental and 
the social score decrease the yield spread, holding also in the top and bottom scores. 
Strong performance in the governance pillar on the other hand increases the spread, again 
confirming the overinvestment theory of this pillar. 
 
Banks are the main lenders in the private debt market and are said to have superior infor-
mation about companies as quasi insiders and thereby are expected to incorporate non-
financial information more effectively than other lenders. Although the private and public 
debt market behave differently in some aspects, this thesis suggests that the two debt 
markets in general value corporate social responsibility similarly in their cost of debt. 
This relationship mainly holds for Euribor bank loans, as for Libor loans only the gov-
ernance pillar behaves similarly with bonds. One key finding of the empirical study re-
veals the asymmetric impact of CSR on Euribor and Libor loans, as the first are influenced 
stronger and significantly in most categories by ESG, and the latter, Libor loans, have no 
significant relationship with ESG in general. Therefore, it can be concluded that corporate 
social responsibility is existing only in the Eurozone debt market, but not in European 
debt markets in other currencies, mainly US Dollar and British Pound. 
 
The results of this thesis confirm the contradicting view of previous research, as some 
CSR aspects decrease, and others increase the cost of debt, confirming both the risk mit-
igation and the overinvestment theory. Practical implications of this research are that 
companies can reduce the interest expenses significantly by focusing on certain aspects 
of CSR and thereby strengthen the income statement. It is still important to balance be-
tween the costs of incorporating responsibility policies and its future positive outcomes.  
 
At this point, future research might provide better insights, especially on what the rela-
tionship between the financial advantages of strong CSR and the cost of implementing it 
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is. Another idea for future research would be to examine on how much of CSR infor-
mation is already incorporated in the credit rating as in previous literature it is suggested 
that the rating already includes CSR. Nevertheless, as proposed by this thesis, by control-
ling for rating, CSR has a significant impact on the cost of private and public debt. By 
examining how much of this kind of information is absorbed by the rating could give 
greater insight in the relationship with the financial markets. In order to prove the finding 
in this thesis that bank loans issued in different currencies, represented by Euribor and 
Libor as base rates, behave asymmetrically to CSR, stronger focus on examining world-
wide private debt markets in different monetary unions could provide better understand-
ing. 
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Appendix 1. Credit rating transformation (Afonso et al. 2012) 
 
Characterization S&P rating Transformed Code 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
g
ra
d
e 
Highest credit quality AAA 20 
Very high credit quality 
AA+ 19 
AA 18 
AA- 17 
High credit quality 
A+ 16 
A 15 
A- 14 
Good credit quality 
BBB+ 13 
BBB 12 
BBB- 11 
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
v
e 
g
ra
d
e 
Speculative 
BB+ 10 
BB 9 
BB- 8 
Highly speculative 
B+ 7 
B 6 
B- 5 
Substantial credit risk 
CCC+ 4 
CCC 3 
CCC- 2 
Very high levels of credit risk CC 1 
Default 
SD 0 
D 0 
  No rating   0 
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Appendix 2. Data sample by country and industry 
 
 Bank Loans Corporate Bonds 
 EURIBOR LIBOR Total 
Panel A: Country     
Austria 8 0 8 14 
Belgium 37 28 65 38 
Denmark 11 8 19 19 
Finland 17 4 21 23 
France 169 28 197 201 
Germany 215 73 288 57 
Greece 4 8 12 1 
Hungary 4 3 7 1 
Ireland 9 0 9 3 
Italy 43 7 50 40 
Netherlands 39 29 68 30 
Norway 2 34 36 15 
Poland 3 4 7 2 
Portugal 4 0 4 0 
Spain 51 13 64 19 
Sweden 36 20 56 38 
Switzerland 38 79 117 41 
United Kingdom 52 631 683 103 
Total 742 969 1711 645 
Panel B: Industry         
Aerospace and Defence 20 14 34 11 
Agriculture 5 15 20 0 
Automotive 36 30 66 19 
Beverage, Food, and Tobacco Processing 50 52 102 60 
Chemicals, Plastics & Rubber 64 43 107 48 
Construction 82 63 145 35 
General Manufacturing 106 100 206 81 
Healthcare 71 79 150 24 
Entertainment & Leisure 28 58 86 35 
Mining 13 71 84 12 
Oil and Gas 24 97 121 21 
REITS 24 48 72 3 
Retail & Supermarkets 47 65 112 26 
Services 58 83 141 126 
Technology 46 37 83 90 
Transportation 30 105 135 40 
Wholesale 38 9 47 14 
Total 742 969 1711 645 
 
 
 
